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There are philosophers whose name sounds familiar, but who very few people 
know in more than a vague sense. And there are philosophers whose footprints 
are all over the recent history of philosophy, but who themselves have retreated 
somewhat in the background. Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) is a bit of both. With-
out doubt, he was one of the most prominent French philosophers in the first half 
of the 20th century, who wrote over twenty books, covering domains as diverse 
as philosophy of science, poetry, art and metaphysics. His ideas profoundly influ-
enced a wide array of authors including Georges Canguilhem, Gilbert Simondon, 
Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu. Up until the 
1980s, Bachelard’s work was widely read by philosophers, scientists, literary theo-
rists, artists, and even wider audiences and in his public appearances he incar-
nated one of the most iconic and fascinating icons of a philosopher. 
And yet, surprisingly, in recent years the interest in Bachelard’s theoretical oeuvre 
seems to have somewhat waned. Apart from some recent attempts to revive his 
thinking, the philosopher’s oeuvre is rarely discussed outside specialist circles, 
often only available for those able to read French.2 In contemporary Anglo-Saxon 
philosophy the legacy of Bachelard seems to consist mainly in his widely known 
book Poetics of Space. While some of Bachelard’s contemporaries, like Georges 
Canguilhem or Gilbert Simondon (see Parrhesia, issue 7), who were profoundly 
influenced by Bachelard, have been rediscovered, the same has not happened for 
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Bachelard’s philosophical oeuvre. 
This special issue aims to redress the balance and to open up his work beyond a 
small in-crowd of experts and aficionado’s in France. It aims to stimulate the dis-
covery of new and understudied aspects of Bachelard’s work, including aspects of 
the intellectual milieu he was working in. Fortunately, for this purpose we were 
able to rely both on renowned Bachelard specialists, such as Hans-Jörg Rheinberg-
er, Cristina Chimisso and Dominique Lecourt, as well as on a number of younger 
scholars who are discovering their work in a different intellectual context. At the 
same time we also want to reassess the value of this oeuvre, which also entails 
examining the reasons and causes of the relative neglect of Bachelard’s work in 
recent times. Has it exhausted its possibilities? Does it have intrinsic limitations 
that have contributed to the eclipse, as some influential, mainly French, philoso-
phers have more or less explicitly suggested?3 
Thus we want to open a discussion about the legacy of Bachelard’s colourful and 
multifaceted philosophy, not in order to idolize it, but to rethink the potential 
relevance of his work for contemporary debates. For while—as with every inter-
esting philosophical oeuvre—there may be good reasons to critically reconsider 
Bachelard’s thinking, there are no good reasons, we claim, to forget about Bach-
elard. He remains one of the most fascinating and productive figures of twentieth 
century thought. Throughout his oeuvre Bachelard has launched provocative and 
novel ideas on the then newest scientific developments as well as on the elements 
and dynamics of the poetic imagination, and he addressed important metaphysi-
cal subjects such as the philosophy of time. He gave us concepts such as phéno-
ménotechique, surrationalisme, rhythmanalyse, métapoétique, rupture épistémologique, 
intermatérialisme, or obstacle épistémologique.
To open this debate we have chosen for a twofold approach. On the one hand it 
traces the manifold afterlives of concepts coined by Bachelard to uncover how 
his theoretical oeuvre still (explicitly or implicitly) permeates contemporary de-
bates. On the other hand, we revisit concepts and theoretical constellations of 
Bachelardian origin that have disappeared in the folds of history to see whether 
and how these concepts could help us rethink contemporary debates in philoso-
phy, science and technology studies, literature theory and cultural studies. Such 
a twofold approach will allow us both to assess in what way Bachelard’s thought 
can still be relevant today but also what must be taken into account if one wants 
to understand what is at stake in contemporary French philosophy. 
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THE LIFE AND WORK OF BACHELARD
A superficial look at his biography already makes clear that Bachelard never fol-
lowed standard trajectories. Born on 27 June 1884 in Bar-sur-Aube, at the border 
between Champagne and Burgundy, he starts his career as a postmaster in his 
hometown. He performs his military service in telegraphy. This job also brings 
him to Paris in 1907. At the same time, he starts studying mathematics and natural 
science. Just before his mobilization for the First World War, he marries Jeanne 
Rossi, a teacher from his hometown. Bachelard stays for more than four years at 
the war front. His young wife will die shortly after the war, leaving him a daughter, 
Suzanne Bachelard. A less well-known fact is that in the fifties and until the eight-
ies, Suzanne Bachelard would also become an important philosopher and episte-
mologist in her own right, working at the interface of philosophy of science and 
phenomenology. From the twenties on, the Bachelards will always be together, 
discussing and influencing each other’s ideas, dividing their time between Paris 
and Burgundy.
In the years after the Great War, Bachelard teaches physics and chemistry in Bar-
sur-Aube. Simultaneously, however, he debarks on a study of philosophy, result-
ing in his agrégation in 1922 and his doctorate in 1927 (thèses supervised by Abel 
Rey and Léon Brunschvicg). Shortly afterwards, aged 46, he takes up a position at 
the university of Dijon.
Bachelard’s early work is mainly situated within the philosophy of science, and 
focuses on physics and chemistry. He is especially interested in the recent con-
ceptual revolutions in 20th century physics, relativity and quantum mechanics, 
and their consequences for science’s epistemology (épistémologie, in the French 
sense of the term).4 Apart from detailed studies of specific phases of the history 
of science, or the early phases of thermodynamics, his most famous books writ-
ten in the thirties are Le Nouvel esprit scientifique (1932) and La Formation de l’esprit 
scientifique (1938). Already in the former it becomes clear that Bachelard’s take 
on epistemology is not a standard one. Notwithstanding the fact that he clearly 
knows his classics,5 Bachelard introduces new elements and a new style in the 
philosophy of science from the start.
Already in Le Nouvel esprit scientifique, for instance, Bachelard denies the classic 
division of labor and territories between philosophy and the human and cultural 
sciences with respect to the study of knowledge and science. This denial is not 
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just a theoretical principle, but influences the way he proceeds, exemplified in 
the exposition of his cases. Bachelard was not the first to blend the history and 
the philosophy of science, with a little help from the young sciences of man, in 
fact he may have been inspired in this by his supervisor Brunschvicg. But the way 
in which the psychology and pedagogy of science intervene in Bachelard’s philo-
sophical texts about science, is undeniably inspired by Bachelard’s experiences 
of teaching science to lycéens and makes it very concrete and productive. What 
is at stake is the mindset of the pupil of science, including all the pre-reflexive 
elements, the ‘pre-judgements’ that are present in it, and that set obstacles for 
a real understanding of physical and chemical phenomena. Breaking away from 
transmitted intuitions about a phenomenon, it has to be understood, i.e. to be 
captured in the net of new and rigorous concepts. Phenomena, moreover, have to 
be produced, and this is what happens in an experiment that is foremost a tech-
nical manipulation intervening in nature, creating effects—a phénoménotechnique 
rather than a phenomenology.
In the 1938 book, La Formation de l’esprit scientifique, the notion of ‘epistemologi-
cal obstacle’ becomes the focus of Bachelard’s attention. Bachelard embarks on 
a new approach to epistemology that encompasses a ‘psychoanalysis of objec-
tive knowledge’ directed towards the description of the imaginary resistances and 
fixations that stand in the way of the desired real knowledge of the phenomenon 
that intrigued us in the first place. Images that occupy the mind are such obsta-
cles. For instance, the image that impels us to see the essence of the phenomenon 
in terms of substances—the element of fire as the substance of heat that is later on 
in late eighteenth century French chemistry replaced by the fluid called caloric—
or the animist image of an organism as directed by an entelecheia. Prejudices like 
these are also associated with such obstacles, such as the belief that general philo-
sophical knowledge should be more fundamental than specialized inquiry, or with 
verbal obstacles, like seeing a word as the expression of an essence, as in Molière’s 
famous parody of the virtus dormitiva of opium. In When memory flows into reason 
the notion of an epistemological obstacle is revisited by Jan Maršálek in order to 
stress the relevance of the distinction between an epistemological obstacle in the 
transition of prescience to science, and a similar but distinct type of obstacle that 
emerges in mature scientific fields.
The aims and tasks now ascribed to epistemology are twofold: on the one hand an-
alyzing obstacles retarding the development of objective knowledge; on the other, 
showing how the dialectic, even polemical work of rationality—the application of 
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rigorous concepts and technical manipulations of phenomena in experiments for 
instance—counteracts against the forces of the imaginary. This results in a new 
kind of open and dynamic rationalist view, devoid of any desire to settle down in a 
philosophical system. Science should not be patronized by philosophical a prioris. 
But Bachelard does not just advocate a ‘purification’ of scientific knowledge from 
all pre-scientific practices, denouncing for instance how the persistent temp-
tation for the primal alchemistic intuition impedes the birth of real chemistry. 
While denouncing substantialist and other images as false origins of knowledge, 
Bachelard at the same time calls for a study of the imaginary reality of the natural 
‘elements’ in their own right. In this view, the four elements of the first so-called 
philosophies of nature are the basic ingredients for an imaginative conception of 
the material universe. Bachelard does not connect these elements to nature itself, 
but to nature as it is imagined and experienced in literary texts invoking natural 
phenomena, or in daydreams. Which is to say the elements are elements of poetic 
imagination, that also must be studied independently. The ‘discovery’ of these 
elements through a kind of epistemic ‘psychoanalysis’ is not only an occasion for 
the rationalist’s verdict on the obstacles, but also a starting point for a specific 
study of the imagination, that will take shape in a second series of works in a new 
genre, the poetics of the imagination. Each of these well-known monographs cir-
cle around special clusters of images and metaphors, gathered from Bachelard’s 
readings of poets and novelists who are drawn to peculiar elements as machines 
that produce specific types of metaphors. The volume on fire, Psychanalyse du feu, 
1938 is almost a companion volume to La Formation, others are devoted to air, wa-
ter, and earth. Apart from the elements, Bachelard also studies imaginary objects 
as small and imperceptible as a candlelight (La flamme d’une chandelle, 1961) and 
as pervasive as space (La Poétique de l’espace, 1957), and phenomena ranging from 
work (travail), to dream (rêve, reverie), the will (La Terre et les rêveries de la volonté, 
1948) and rest (La Terre et les rêveries du repos, 1946).
In the early thirties Bachelard also wrote two intriguing books that can be situated 
in between his epistemological and poetical works: L’intuition de l’instant (1932) 
and La dialectique de la durée (1936). Here he advances the intriguing thesis that 
time is constructed out of singular instants: if anything deserves to be called real 
and immediate, it is the instant. The temporal continuum is only a temporal con-
struction, an assemblage of instants that are strung together. This is a complete 
reversal of the, at the time, immensely popular Bergsonian philosophy of dura-
tion, where the instantaneous moment was considered as a secondary construc-
tion (and a spatialized fixation, for that matter, linked to clock time) abstracted 
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from the only reality, the continuous flow of duration. 
At the beginning of the Second World War, in 1940, Bachelard receives a profes-
sorship at the Sorbonne in the history and philosophy of science, as the succes-
sor of Abel Rey.6 During the war, Bachelard also takes up Rey’s presidency of the 
Institut d’histoire des sciences et des techniques in Paris (later called Institut d’histoire 
et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques, currently a CNRS group within the 
framework of Paris-I). At the same time, he is increasingly well-known for his se-
ries of books on poetics. While this may add up to a somewhat strange public im-
age, there is no chronological break between the poetical and the epistemological 
Bachelard. He continues to write three more works on the philosophy of science: 
Le rationalisme appliqué (1949), L’activité rationaliste de la physique contemporaine 
(1951), and Le matérialisme rationnel (1953) along with his work on poetics. Evi-
dently, Bachelard’s firm belief that poetic imagination should be separated from 
scientific thought did not refrain him from working in both fields, never ceasing 
to express his unrestricted admiration for his two types of heroes: the scientist 
and the poet. 
Eventually, Bachelard retires in 1954, with Georges Canguilhem as his successor 
at the Sorbonne as well as at the Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et 
des techniques.7 In 1955, Bachelard is elected as a member of the Académie des sci-
ences morales et politiques and he continued writing until his death on 16 October 
1962 in Paris. Among his latest works is La Poétique de l’espace (1957), a book that, 
possibly under the influence also of his daughter, brought him closer to phenom-
enology. This book would make him posthumously famous outside the French-
speaking world. At the end of his life, he was also working on a complete revision 
of the very first of his ‘psychoanalytic files,’ the one on fire. Suzanne Bachelard 
posthumously edited these reflections in Fragments d’une poétique du feu (1988), 
about, among other things, resurrection and the figure of the phoenix, a forgotten 
mythical persona rising from the ashes of oblivion—who symbolizes our current 
undertaking…
THE FRENCH RECEPTION OF BACHELARD’S WORK
To fully grasp the importance of Bachelard’s oeuvre, its reception both in France 
and abroad must be taken into account. Although he was very productive since 
the end of the 1920s, the first more substantial reception of his work occurs after 
the Second World War. Apart from occasional brief mentions and references, the 
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first real articles on his work would only date from the 1950s, for instance by Jean 
Hyppolite or in Bachelard’s liber amicorum, published in 1957.8 Of course, this does 
not mean that his work went unnoticed before: Bachelard was very present and 
well-known among his colleagues, students and friends—presumably too present 
to already become an object of study. And, despite the fact that Paris was more in-
clined towards existentialism in those years, his classes were massively attended, 
by students, scientists and artists. 
It is evident that the initial interest for Bachelard in France was divided between 
his epistemology and his work on imagination. In the 1960s there were major pub-
lications on Bachelard’s views of the imaginary and rêverie.9 Many of these publi-
cations are linked with the French New Criticism or nouvelle critique, with authors 
such as Roland Barthes, who saw Bachelard as one of their main inspirations. At 
the same time Bachelard’s writings on historical epistemology and philosophy of 
science were picked up by a new generation of philosophers and scientists. Au-
thors such as Georges Canguilhem or François Dagognet wrote early studies on 
his philosophy of science.10 Similarly, many of his epistemological concepts played 
a role in the work of Alexandre Koyré, Jean-Toussaint Desanti or Michel Foucault. 
Foucault, for example, famously placed Bachelard on “the line that separates a 
philosophy of experience, of sense, and of subject and a philosophy of knowledge, 
of rationality and of concept” where “one network is that of Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty” while the other is “that of Cavaillès, Bachelard and Canguilhem.”11
Considering the case of Foucault already makes clear that Bachelard’s influence 
is not limited to thought about the natural sciences, but that his work proved 
to be a productive philosophy for the social sciences as well. This is also clear 
in the work of Gilles-Gaston Granger, student of Bachelard and Cavaillès, who 
applied insights from Bachelard, combined with structuralism and analytic phi-
losophy, to the philosophy of the social sciences.12 But equally unexplored is Bach-
elard’s legacy in fields like sociology, through the work of authors such as Georges 
Gurvitch and Pierre Bourdieu. The latter’s ‘handbook’ for sociology, has, for in-
stance, been described as “almost exclusively built on Bachelard’s philosophy of 
science.”13 Although Bruno Latour himself expressed it as criticism of Bourdieu’s 
work, this remark does not seem unwarranted. Latour is part of a new generation 
of Francophone philosophers of science that critically revisit Bachelard’s work. 
This is especially true for Michel Serres, one of Latour’s main sources of inspira-
tion. Serres started out as a master student of Bachelard, but became very critical 
from the 1970s onwards. A good example of his critique can be found in the text 
8 · simons, rutgeerts, masschelein and cortois 
The Reformation and the Seven Sins (“La Réforme et les sept péchés”), for the first time 
translated in this special issue, in which Serres critiques his former tutor’s wish 
to subject epistemic practices to a thorough purification before they could aspire 
to be conceived of as science. Similar criticisms and attitudes can be found in the 
work of Latour and Isabelle Stengers.
Bachelard’s work was also mobilized in a somewhat surprising context: Marxism. 
Louis Althusser, the new rising star of the left and a student of Bachelard, used 
Bachelard’s ideas to support his radically new view on Marx’s oeuvre, claiming 
that there exists a fundamental divide between the early humanist writings of 
Marx and his later ‘scientific’ work. To define this divide, Althusser invoked a no-
tion from Bachelard’s work: the epistemological break (coupure épistémologique). 
Although Bachelard himself never used the notion of ‘break’ (coupure) and only 
rarely that of ‘rupture,’ the term suddenly came to be conceived of as one of the 
philosopher’s main concepts.14 Many authors have, based on more or less the same 
‘argument’ (but not for the same reasons) considered Bachelard as a Kuhnian-
avant-la-lettre: this observation already suffices to seriously question the signifi-
cance of analogies of the kind.15 It is a fact that at least two types of discontinuities 
play an important role in Bachelard’s own epistemology: the ‘synchronic’ discon-
tinuity between science and common sense (or primary intuitions), and the ‘dia-
chronic’ discontinuity separating prescientific phases of a field of epistemic activ-
ity from the scientific stage (from which, in turn, a ‘new scientific mindset’ would 
eventually emerge). In his contribution about the relation between Bachelard and 
Althusser, David Maruzzella argues that although the early Althusser was inspired 
by Bachelard, his philosophy paradoxically became more truly Bachelardian in his 
later work, when he breaks with his earlier epistemological ambitions in order to 
pursue a more political project.
In the 1960s and 70s, the work of Bachelard was thus suddenly drawn into the 
center of the philosophical debates in France, including the larger discussion on 
Marxism and Structuralism.16 Althusser took up a leading role in the develop-
ment of a scientific reformulation and regeneration of Marxism by proposing that 
Marxism become Structuralism, in the hope that, this way, Structuralism would 
become Marxism. Other students of Althusser soon took up the notion of coupure, 
and/or rupture attributed to Bachelard.17 One of those students was Dominique 
Lecourt, who wrote his doctoral thesis L’epistemologie historique de Gaston Bach-
elard under the supervision of Canguilhem, The companion volume Bachelard ou 
Le jour et la nuit would define the way Bachelard has been read in the 70s and 
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the 80s as a crypto-Marxists thinker.18 In “Anti-Bachelardianism in Contempo-
rary French Philosophy” Lecourt himself historically contextualizes and critically 
reflects on this kind of once dominant reading of Bachelard, and argues that the 
time has come to develop a more complex understanding of the latter’s signifi-
cance. Lecourt’s writings have also played an important role in the strict divi-
sion of Bachelard’s thinking into epistemological work, or ‘Bachelard of the day,’ 
and his writing on poetical imagination, the ‘Bachelard of the night.’19 As a result, 
many authors who have taken up Bachelard’s work focus only on half of his work, 
ignoring the other part. 
In recent years, however, we can witness a countermovement in France. A range 
of authors has refused to reduce Bachelard to either an epistemologist or an aes-
thetic theorist highlighting instead the metaphysical and philosophical theories 
that fuel his thinking in both domains. This has been one of the main merits of the 
work of Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, linked with the International Gaston Bach-
elard Association (Association Internationale Gaston Bachelard, A.I.G.B), founded 
in 1984.20 From 1998 onwards, the association has also been publishing a range 
of Cahiers Gaston Bachelard, dealing with specific topics ranging from Bachelard’s 
relation to German philosophy, to the influence of psychoanalysis on his work. 
One of the most productive discussions in this context has been a revived interest 
in Bachelard’s metaphysically oriented works, such as L’intuition de l’instant and 
Dialectique de la durée. Bachelard’s philosophy of time influences both his subse-
quent writings on epistemology and on imagination. Entering into a polemical 
debate with the work of Henri Bergson, Bachelard develops a time that is dialec-
tical and discontinuous. The fierceness of his tone, however, raises questions to 
what extent his own work is indebted to Bergson.21 In “Towards an Interdisci-
plinary Anthropology?” Johannes D.M. Schick focuses on the similarities in the 
thinking of Bachelard and Bergson, and Georges Simondon as a figure who allows 
for an escape from the theoretical deadlock between the two contemporaries. In 
“Becoming Rhythm,” Jonas Rutgeerts proposes a more nuanced understanding of 
the polemical discussion between Bergson and Bachelard by exploring the impor-
tance of the notion of rhythm in both philosophical systems.
Another of Bachelard’s notions that blurs the distinction between science and 
art—day and night—is surrationalism. Bachelard launched the term in a text of 
1936, and it pops up in later texts, such as in his Philosophie du non (1940). Next 
to its obvious reference to surrealism (a movement Bachelard had frequented for 
some years), the term is also closely linked to Bachelard’s idea of an ‘open ratio-
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nalism.’ In Bachelard’s view, the rationality of science is a dynamic and open one, 
operating in the modus of a permanent rectification of concepts and theories. 
Such a dynamic openness can be found both in his work on science and in that of 
poetics. The thesis has been taken up again in a recent book by Zbigniew Kotowicz, 
who argues that for Bachelard philosophy “is not the business of contemplating 
reality but of surpassing it.”22 Kotowicz also provides an English translation of the 
text on surrationalism as an appendix to his first chapter. Massimiliano Simons’ 
text “Surrationalism after Bachelard” takes up this notion in order to re-read the 
relation between Bachelard and Michel Serres, with a focus on the latter’s early 
project of writing about the nouveau nouvel esprit scientifique, an attempt to update 
Bachelard through new scientific findings in information theory and molecular 
biology Through this attempted update Serres would come to one of his later 
criticisms of Bachelard. Simons shows that, despite Serres’ self-proclaimed turn 
away from Bachelard, there are still significant parallels between Serres and his 
predecessor.
 
THE ANGLO-SAXON RECEPTION OF HIS WORK
The reception of Bachelard’s work abroad, especially in the Anglo-Saxon context 
is probably even more capricious than the French one.23 Bachelard himself has 
hardly published anything in English, except for a text in a Festschrift for Albert 
Einstein.24 The Anglo-Saxon world therefore had to rely on secondary works and 
translations, both profoundly coloring its reception. 
One of the elements that heavily influenced the Bachelard reception in the Anglo-
Saxon world is the fact that, while all the major works on poetics and imagination 
have been translated early on, Bachelard’s epistemological works have only slowly 
and selectively found their way to Anglophone audiences.25 The first translations 
of The Poetics of Space and The Psychoanalysis of Fire (both in 1964) were followed 
by The Philosophy of No, dealing with epistemology, in 1968. In 1981, inspired by its 
director Joanne H. Stroud, the Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture con-
tracted a project with the editor José Corti to translate all of Bachelard’s books 
on the imagination. This resulted in eight additional translations, such as Air and 
Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement (1988), The Flame of a Candle 
(1989) and The Right to Dream (1990). During this period, no epistemological 
works were translated, except for The New Scientific Spirit, appearing in 1988. 
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Only more recently, a few new translations have been published, such as The For-
mation of the Scientific Mind (2002), Intuition of the Instant (2013), and Dialectic 
of Duration (2018).26 However, several of Bachelard’s major books in philosophy 
of science are to this date not yet available for international audiences. In the 
Anglo-Saxon context, this situation has contributed to an image of his work as 
only or largely dealing with imagination and literature. Taking at least a small 
step to overcome this lacuna, this special issue includes the translation of the 
first chapter of Intuitions Atomistiques (1933): “The Metaphysics of Dust” in which 
Bachelard analyses the various shapes of dust and their relation to a philosophy of 
atomism. Written in 1933, in between L’Intuition de l’instant and La Dialectique de la 
durée, Bachelard’s essay on atomism can be seen as one of his first ventures into 
metaphysics. At the same time, however, it also prefigures Bachelard’s passion for 
poetic imagery. Despite the fact that Bachelard condemns the “traditional prin-
ciples of atomism” for being essentialist, i.e. ascribing essential characteristics to 
the atoms, and advocates to replace this essentialist vision with a mathematical 
one, in which the atoms derive their properties from their constellation, “The 
Metaphysics of Dust” still displays a great interest in all those traditional versions 
of atomism. Rather than simply brushing over obsolete ideas, Bachelard describes 
the image of dust in great detail. Here, we can already witness the germs of his 
fascination for the ‘natural elements’ to which he will devotes several books. 
In the Anglo-Saxon secondary literature, a second bias can be pointed at. It has, 
for instance, been proven crucial that one of the first books on Bachelard available 
in English was precisely a translation of the work of Dominique Lecourt.27 To-
gether with early translations of Althusser’s own work, such as For Marx (in 1969) 
and Reading Capital (in 1970), Lecourt’s book has contributed the incorrect view 
that Bachelard himself was a Marxist-inspired philosopher of science and even led 
some to claim that Bachelard’s work aimed to “portray scientists as a proletariat 
exploited by bourgeois philosophers who held them accountable to standards not 
of their own making.”28
A similar bias exists within the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), due 
to the fact that many of Latour’s books were available in English long before those 
of Bachelard. In Laboratory Life (1979), written together with Steve Woolgar, La-
tour introduces the notion of phénoménotechnique to argue that within scientific 
practices it “is not simply that phenomena depend on certain material instrumen-
tation; rather, the phenomena are thoroughly constituted by the material setting 
of the laboratory.”29 According to some, the result was an incorrect “association, 
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made by social constructivists, between phenomenotechnique and their own 
claims concerning the socially determined character of scientific practices.”30 In 
“Gaston Bachelard’s Philosophy of Science: Between Project and Practice” Bas de 
Boer looks at contemporary debates into science studies through the lens of phe-
nomenotechnique. With Bachelard, de Boer stresses that science is neither com-
pletely ahistorical and rational, nor completely situated and constructed. Rather, 
science is the particular execution of a universal project.31
In light of this, Bachelard’s work has been taken up by a range of scholars under 
the banner of ‘historical epistemology,’ for instance in the work of Ian Hacking or 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger.32 The notion of phenomenotechnique is one of the cen-
tral Bachelardian concepts in this tradition and demonstrates an interesting ten-
sion between historical epistemologists and STS. Whereas the first group tends to 
be positive about Bachelard, the second has become quite critical, although both 
groups do not necessarily diverge substantially about the positions they defend. 
Thus it remains an open question to what extent there is an actual conflict be-
tween Bachelard and fields such as ‘science studies’ or to what extent they could 
enrich one another.33
Within STS, however, the notion of phenomenotechnique has also been linked to 
another concept, that of ‘technoscience,’ often falsely attributed to Bachelard.34 
The concept of ‘technoscience’ itself was originally coined by Gilbert Hottois in 
the 1970s, but was later popularized by authors such as Jean-François Lyotard 
and Latour, both partly inspired by Bachelard.35 Technoscience refers to how sci-
ence is always linked with applications and with broader societal goals, such as 
efficiency and performativity. Bachelard himself never used the concept, but it 
approximates some of his ideas related to phenomenotechnique and his ‘applied 
rationalism.’ On the one hand, the role of concepts and theories within the con-
temporary sciences is highlighted, on the other hand, concepts and theories can 
no longer be clearly demarcated from technical applications and conditions. 
In “The new axiomatic method: Bachelard on the meaning and deformation of 
concepts,” Boris Demarest stresses that one must be weary of all-too facile equa-
tions such as of phenomenotechnique with technoscience. Instead, Demarest ar-
gues that for Bachelard phenomenotechnique must be linked first of all to con-
cept formation, which must be understood in connection with David Hilbert’s 
axiomatic method. For Demarest, contemporary re-readings of notions such as 
phenomenotechnique ought to be subjected to a substantial dose of skepticism.
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WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM BACHELARD TODAY?
Given this state of the art, numerous questions can be raised about the influenc-
es, interactions and relations of Bachelard and his contemporaries, subsequent 
generations, and broader scientific and cultural developments. As with Bergson, 
one may wonder how Bachelard’s philosophy relates to classic authors such as 
Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel or Nietzsche, all of whom seem to play a role in Bach-
elard’s work and are occasionally referred to by him. Similar questions can be 
raised about interactions with his contemporaries and immediate predecessors 
or successors, such as Léon Brunschvicg, Emile Meyerson, Jean Cavaillès, Ferdi-
nand Gonseth or Hélène Metzger. And how to estimate Bachelard’s use of then 
recent scientific domains such as quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity? 
His ‘new scientific spirit’ was nothing else than an attempt to grasp the novelty 
of these new sciences. But how to map his interpretation of these novel sciences 
among the many possible (and actual) interpretations that have been given? What 
about his comments on the scientific and philosophical views of, for example, 
Einstein or Louis de Broglie? What about his views on earlier phases of sciences, 
e.g. on sciences that already took their great leap forward before the advent of the 
so-called new scientific spirit? Chemistry, for instance, was crucial in the educa-
tion of Bachelard and many of his contemporaries, such as Meyerson, Metzger 
and Duhem, or more recently, François Dagognet, Isabelle Stengers and Berna-
dette Bensaude-Vincent.36
Then again, this is not a plea to just shift the focus back to the context of epis-
temology: similar questions must be asked about Bachelard’s attitude towards 
psychoanalysis, existentialism or phenomenology. It is important even to look 
beyond the field of philosophy proper, and review Bachelard’s relations with art-
ists and scientist. In his article, Rheinberger attempts to analyze one of those 
‘external relations,’ as he explores the fruitful collaboration between the French 
philosopher and the relatively unknown engraver Albert Flocon. This will hope-
fully stimulate a contemporary audience to not only consider Bachelard’s ‘new 
scientific spirit’ in relation to the cultural, philosophical and scientific develop-
ments of his own time, but also in relation to the sciences and cultures as they are 
happening, in our time and into the future. 
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